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I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 26, 1994, the German parliament adopted the Second Financial
Market Promotion Law (Zweites Finanzmarktfdrderungsgesetz'),which is
described as the most important reform of the German financial market in the
last one hundred years because of its severe impact on various stock
exchange and capital market related acts.2 With its enactment, the German
legislature began to regulate insider trading for the first time in German
history. The insider trading provisions are thereby included in the German
Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) (WpHG),3 which is
contained in article one of the Second Financial Markets Promotion Law.
With respect to the German Securities Trading Act's decisive influence
on both the trading activities and investment counseling practices of brokers
and banks, combined with the Act's implications on the standard of conduct
of listed corporations, few articles written in English4 have discussed the

1. The full title is: Gesetz Ober den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung b6rsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Act on Securities Trading and for the
Modification of Regulations Governing the Stock Exchanges and Securities) (Zweites
Finanzmarktf'rderungsgesetz) (Second Financial Market Promotion Law), v.26.7.1994 (BGB1.
I S.1749).
2. It affected, for example, the Stock Exchange Act, the Securities Sales Prospectus Act,
the Stock Corporation Act, the Commercial Code, and the Insider Guidelines.
3. Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz, art. 1, Gesetz Ober den Wertpapierhandel Art.
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) (Securities Trading Act), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1750-60)
[hereinafter WpHG]. An English translation of the Act can be ordered from the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandel (Federal Supervisory Authority) in Frankfurt/Main,
Germany.
4. The following articles have at least partially addressed the German Securities Trading
Act.

TONY HICKINBOTHAM & CHRISTOPH VAUPEL, INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING,

GERMANY PART 129 (Stamp Welsh ed. 1996); KONRAD MOHR, GERMAN INSIDER AND STOCK
EXCHANGE LAW (1995); Eberhard H. R6hm, Germany, in 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 8C. 11 (Harold S. Bloomenthal ed., Clark Boardman
Callaghan Series 1991); Joseph Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's
Afraid of Self-Restraint?, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 507 (1986); Christof von Dryander, The
German Securities TradingAct: Insider Tradingand OtherSecondary Market Regulation, 9(1)
INSIGHTS 26 (1995); James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider'sLook into the Regulation of Insider
Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1996) (also providing a general overview
of the regulatory scheme of the German financial markets); Ursula C. Pfeil, Finanzplatz
Deutschland: Germany Enacts Insider Trading Legislation, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
137 (1996); Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the
International Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 199 (1992); HansBernd Schdfer & Claus Ott, Economic Effects of EEC Insider Trading Regulation Applied to
Germany, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 357 (1992) (for data materials regarding detected insider
violations in Germany prior to the Securities Trading Act's enactment); Daniel James Standen,
Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracingfor the Cold Winds of Change, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 177 (1995); Symposium, New Approaches to SecuritiesRegulation, 29 INT'L
LAW. 839 (1995). All of the articles above have covered the Securities Trading Act, without,
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importance of this Act. Most cover a wide range of provisions of the
German Securities Trading Act without focusing in detail on the insider
dealing sections. In contrast, scholarly work on this subject written in
German is quite extensive.5

however, providing guidance in detail questions.
5. See ARBEITSKREIS GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, VERBOT DES INSIDERHANDELS
[PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING] (1976); KLAUS DIETER ASSMANN & UWE H. SCHNEIDER,
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ [COMMENTARY TO THE SECURITIES TRADING ACT] (1995);
JOACHIM BECKER, DAS NEUE WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESTZ [THE NEW SECURITIES TRADING
ACT] (1995); CARSTEN PETER CLAUSSEN, BANK- UND BORSENRECHT [BANK AND SECURITY
EXCHANGE LAW] (1996); DEUTSCHE B(RSE AG, INSIDERHANDELSVERBOTE UND AD-HOC
PUBLIZITAT NACH DEM WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ [INSIDER TRADING PROHIMON AND ADHoc PUBLICITY ACCORDING TO THE SECURITIES TRADING ACT] (1994); SIEGFRIED KOMPEL,
BANK- UND KAPITALMARKTRECHT [BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET LAWS] (1995); HANNS
CHRISTOPH SEBOLD, DAS NEUE INSIDERRECHT: VON DER FREIWILLIGEN SELBSTKONTROLLE

ZUM INTERNATIONALEN STANDARD [THE NEW INSIDER LAW: FROM FREE-WILLED SELFCONTROL TO THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD] (1994); Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Das kiinftige
deutsche Insiderrecht (I) [The Forthcoming German Insider Law (I)], DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG], June 1994, at 196 [hereinafter Assman, Part/]; Heinz-Dieter Assmann,

Das ktinftige deutsche Insiderrecht(II) [The FutureGerman InsiderLaw, (II)], AG, June 1994,
at 237 [hereinafter Assman, Part 11]; Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Das neue deutsche Insiderrecht
[The New German Insider Law], ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENSUND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR], 1994, at 494 [hereinafter Assmann, The New German Insider
Law]; Jella Benner-Heinacher, Kollidiert die Auskunftspflicht des Vorstands mit dem
Insidergesetz? [Is the Reporting Duty of the Management Boardin Collision with the Insider
Law?], DER BETRIEB [DB], 1995, at 765; Karl-Burkhard Caspari, Die geplanteInsiderregelung
in der Praxis [PracticalAspect of the Planned Insider Law], ZGR, 1994, at 530; Carsten P.
Claussen, Das neue Insiderrecht [The New Insider Law], DB, 1994, at 27; Markus Gehrlein,
Die geltende deutsche Insiderregelung [The Actually Effective German Insider Regulation],
DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE BERATUNG [WIB], 1994, at 344; Klaus J. Hopt, Europdisches und
deutsches Insiderrecht [European and German Insider Law], ZGR, 199 1, at 17 [hereinafter
Hopt, European & German InsiderLaw]; Klaus J. Hopt, Rechtsprobleme des europaischen
und deutschen Insiderrechts[Legal Problems Under the European and German Insider Law],
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFrLICHE FORSCHUNG UND PRAXIS [BFuP], 1994, at 85 [hereinafter Hopt,
Legal Problems]; Klaus J. Hopt, Grundsatz- und Praxisproblemenach dem Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Basic and PracticeProblems Under the Securities TradingAct], ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
DAS GESAMTE HANDEL- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR], 159 (1995), at 135 (hereinafter
Hopt, BasicProblems];Frank A. Immenga, Dasneue Insiderrechtim Wertpapierhandelsgesetz
[The New Insider Law of the Securities Trading Act], ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKRECHT UND
BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB], 1995, at 197; Klaus H. Jander & Manuela Zoberbier, Das Zweite
Finanzmarktfrderungsgesetzmit der Neuregelung des Insiderrechts [The Second Financial
Markets PromotionAct with the New Regulation of the InsiderLaw], WIB, 1994, at 806; Peter
Joussen, Auskunftspflicht des Vorstandes nach § 131 AktG und Insiderrecht [The Reporting
Duty of the Management Board Under AktG, Section 131, and Insider Law], DB, 1994, at
2485; Siegfried Kompel, Die knftige Kapitalmarktaufsicht und die europaische
Rechtsangleichung [The Future Financial Markets Supervision and the European Harmonization of Law Process], DIE WERTPAPIERMITrEILUNGEN [WM], 1994, at 229 [hereinafter
Kampel, FinancialMarkets Supervision]; Siegfried Kompel, Zum Begriffder Insidertatsache
[The Term Inside Information], WM, 1994, at 2137 [hereinafter Krnpel, Inside Information];
Andreas M611er, Das neue Insiderrecht-EcpfeilerfunktionsfahigerWertpapiermarkte [The
New Insider Law - Essential Supporting Beam for Functional Securities Markets], BFuP,
1994, at 99; Martin Peltzer, Die neue Insiderregelungim Entwurfdes Zweiten Finanzmarktfir-
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The purpose of this article is to provide an in-depth- analysis of-the
suppressive provisions of the Act, as well as to illustrate its notification
provisions through which the danger of criminal prosecution can be
diminished. Moreover, where it seems appropriate for clarity and contrast,
this article will refer to the U.S. counterparts of the Act's fundamental
regulations. Consequently, part IIbriefly focuses on the developments
leading to the enactment of the Act, and part II provides a concentrated
illustration of the Act's major provisions such as suppressive6 and preventive7 measures, and the establishment of a continuous supervision system.8
It also contains a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the Act's central
definitions and concepts such as "inside information,"'9 "insider,"' 10 "insider
securities,"" and "prohibition of insider dealing."' 2 This part discusses the
application of the relevant provisions to professional groups, such as
stockbrokers, security analysts, and employees of issuers, with regard to their
respective obligations. The reporting and disclosure duties of the Act are
discussed in part IV. Finally, the article concludes with an evaluation of
insider regulation under the Act.
II. BACKGROUND/DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO ENACTMENT
Before the Securities Trading Act became effective, in 1970, the German
legislature had attempted to prevent insider trading with the promulgation of
the Insider Trading Guidelines 3 last revised in 1988. The Guidelines were

derungsgesetzes [The New Insider Regulation in the Draft Bill of the Second Financial
Markets Promotion Act], ZIP, 1994, at 746; Klaus Rellermeyer, Das Zweite Finanzmarlaorderungsgesetz in der praktischen Umsetzung [The Second FinancialMarkets Promotion Act
and Its Adoption in the Practice], WM, 1995, at 1981; Hans-Joachim Schwarze, Insideregelung im Spannungsfeld der Praktikabilitdt[Insider Regulation and the Conflict with
Their Practicability],BFuP, 1994, at 124; Martin Weber, Deutsches Kapitalmarktrecht im
Umbruch [German Capital Market Law in a Changing Situation], NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW], 1994, at 2849 [hereinafter Weber, Changing Situation]; Ulf
Andreas Weber, Das neue deutsche Insiderrecht[The New German Insider Law], BB, Jan.
1995, at 157 [hereinafter Weber, The New German Insider Law].
6. Suppressive measures are contained in § 14 (Prohibition of Insider Dealing), § 18
(Criminal Proceedings in Cases of Insider Violations), and §§ 38-40 (Criminal Offense and
Misdemeanor Provisions) of the WpHG. WpHG §§ 38-40, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753,
1754, & 1759-60, respectively).
7. Preventive regulations are especially the public disclosure and reporting duties under
WpHG. Id. § 15, at S.1753-54.
8. Id. § 16, at S.1754 (Continuous Supervision).
9. Id. § 13, at S.1753.
10. Id.
11. Id. § 12, at S.1753.
12. Id. § 14, at S.1753.
13. Insiderhandelsrichtlinien(Insider Trading Guidelines), WM, 1988, at 1066ff. See
SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 57, and Blum, supra note 4, at 507 for more information with
regard to these Guidelines.
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generally regarded as quite ineffective, since they neither had the legal
authority of an enacted law, nor were they accepted by courts as trade
practice. 4 Rather, the Insider Trading Guidelines presented a set of
voluntary rules of conduct that could only become legally binding through
their inclusion in private contracts.1 5 Theoretically, a violation of such a
contractual arrangement could be pursued under certain laws relating to
economic offenses.' 6 In practice, however, violations of the Guidelines
were very rarely detected and only resulted in damages for breach of a
contractual obligation. 7
Moreover, the board of inquiry that supervises conformity with the
Insider Trading Guidelines had limited investigative authority. For instance,
it was not allowed to seize evidence, and inquiries about suspicious trading
activities had to be approved by the involved parties. 8 As a consequence,
this voluntary system of self-control was widely criticized for its inefficiency.
Scholarly publications 9 called for statutory regulations prohibiting insider
transactions, referring to the insider laws of many other countries with major
capital markets like the United States and Great Britain. However, the critics
of the self-regulating system could not prevail over the system's proponents
because until the end of the 1980s, Germany lacked the scandalous and big
insider cases that would have attracted the attention of a wider spectrum of
investors.20
This situation changed with the enactment of a European Union (EU)
Council Directive 2' in November 1989, which did not directly prohibit
insider trading, but rather contained specific regulations that had to be
implemented by the EU member states, with the intention of eroding insider
activities. Faced with this directive and the perception that the German
financial market was less attractive to international investors due to, among
other reasons, the lack of insider dealing regulation, the German legislature

14. See Pitt & Hardison, supra note 4, at 199.
15. Gehrlein, supra note 5, at 344; Pfeil, supra note 4, at 141.

16. For example, § 404(2) of the Aktiengesetz (Corporation Act). Aktiengesetz
(Corporation Act) § 404(2), v.6.9.1965 (BGBI. I S.1089-1185) [hereinafter AktG].
17. Gehrlein, supra note 5, at 345; Standen, supra note 4, at 197.
18. Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 806; Pfeil, supra note 4, at 142.
19. As an example, see Gesetzesentwurf zum Insiderhandel des Arbeitskreis
Gesellschaftsrecht [Proposal of an Insider Trading Act from

the Arbeitskreis

Gesellschaftsrecht], in ARBErrsKREIS GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, supra note 5, at 55.
20. Assmann, PartI, supra note 5, at 198. For data on detected insider trades under the
Insider Trading Guidelines, see SchAfer & Ott, supra note 4.
21. EU, Council Directive 89/592, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989,
O.J. (L334) 30; see Lynda M. Ruiz, European Community Directive on Insider Dealing: A
Model for Effective Enforcement ofProhibitionson Insider Tradingin InternationalSecurities
Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 235-39 (1995).
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ultimately took action and adopted the Securities Trading Act.22 The
German parliament describes the purpose of the Act as the improvement of
the attractiveness and international competitiveness of the German financial
markets by increasing investor protection and broadening the availability of
material corporate information. 23 This goal was crucial to the strength of
the German capital markets since the international financial markets had
become more and more competitive. Consequently, governmental regulations
play an increasingly decisive role in investment decisions. 24 Since investors
look carefully at the equal availability of corporate information as a basic
component of fair investment chances, insider trading prohibitions were
essential for fulfilling the demands of these groups and thereby providing
German corporations with needed capital.25
ILL.

ANALYSIS

A.

Structure

The structure of the Securities Trading Act can be divided into provisions
designed to avoid insider trading through the prohibition and criminal
prosecution of insider dealing (suppressive measures), those that establish
public disclosure and reporting duties (preventive measures), and those that
establish a system of continuous market supervision.
1. Suppressive Provisions and Preventive Measures
The essential suppressive measure of the Securities Trading Act is
undoubtedly the insider trading prohibition. 26 The scope of this provision
is determined by the term "insiders," which is defined as persons who (1) as
members of the supervisory 27 or management28 body, (2) as shareholders
or partners of the issuer,2 9 or (3) by reason of their profession or
employment relationship, have, in due course, obtained knowledge of inside

22. CLAUSSEN, supra note 5, § 9 n.9; Dryander, supra note 4, at 26; Immenga, supra note
5, at 199.
23. This is a nonexclusive enumeration. Other measures for improving the quality of the
German financial markets include the removal of certain limitations in the Corporation Act,
as well as in the Securities Deposit Act. See Freis, supra note 4, at 37.
24. Gesetzesentwurf (draft bill) Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, BUNDESTAGDRUCKSACHE 12/6679, at 33 [hereinafter BT-DRuCKS] (explanation of the Federal
government).
25. Id.
26. WpHG § 14, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
27. Id. § 13(1)1., at S.1753 (Aufsichtsorgan translates as supervisory body).
28. Id. (Geschdftsfiihrungsorgantranslates as management body).
29. Id. § 13(1)2., at S.1753.
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information" (the primary insiders).3' In addition to these specific groups,
anyone else who has knowledge of inside information and cannot be assigned
to one of the above presented groups also qualifies as an insider32 (the
secondary insider).33
The distinction between primary and secondary insiders is especially
important with regard to their respective obligations under the insider trading
prohibition. Primary insiders are subject to a threefold exploitation restriction
of their inside knowledge. First, trading in inside securities, 34 whether for
their own account or that of a third party, is prohibited.35 Second, a
primary insider shall not convey his inside information to another person.36
Finally, a primary insider is precluded from recommending the purchase or
sale insider securities to another person 31 In U.S. law this is known as tipper/tippee liability. In contrast, secondary insiders merely are subject to a
utilization prohibition of their knowledge, which includes the restriction on
the sale or purchase of insider securities for their account or the account of
38

a third party.

A primary or secondary insider is someone who is in the possession of
inside information. 39 "Inside information" is defined as "information which
has not been made public relating to one or more issuers of insider securities,
or to inside securities, which if it were made public, would be likely to have
a significant effect on the price of the insider security."40 Violations of the
insider trading prohibition are prosecuted under the sections of the Act that

30. Id. § 13(1)3., at S.1753.

31. The term "primary insider" is not used in the text of the Act itself, but it can be
concluded from the structure of the Act (the distinction between insiders and third persons
who have knowledge of inside information) that "primary insiders" are the group of people
who are the insiders in the Act. Consequently, "secondary insiders" are the "third persons
with knowledge of inside information." Indeed, the federal government used the terms
primary and secondary insider in its explanation to the proposed bill, BT-DRucKs, supra note
24, at 46, in the same context as defined here. Since most of the scholarly publications also
are based on this terminology, this article will follow their usage.
32. WpHG § 14(1)2., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).

33. "Secondary insiders" is equivalent to "third persons with knowledge of inside
information" named in the Act. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 31.
34. WpHG § 12, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753) (defining insider securities). For further
discussion, see infra part III.B.3.
35. WpHG § 14(1)1, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
36. Id. § 14(1)2., at S.1753.
37. Id. § 14(1)3., at S.1753.
38. Id. § 14(2), at S.1753.
39. Id. § 13(1), at S.1753.
40. Id. The original German formulation is "Kenntnis von einernicht 6ffentlich bekannten
Tatsache hat, die sich auf einen oder mehrere Emittenten von Insiderpapieren oder auf
Insiderpapierebezieht und die geeignet ist, in Falle ihres 6ffentlichen Bekanntwerdens den
Kurs der Insiderpapiere erheblich zu beeinfluflen (Insidertatsache)." Id.
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deal with criminal proceedings. 4 These regulations are discussed later in
this article.4 2
In addition to the above mentioned provisions that are designed to deter
potential insiders, the Securities Trading Act has instituted a duty for issuers
of securities to publish and report information,"3 which could affect the
price of those securities in realization that the basic precondition for
profitable insider trade is the imbalance of knowledge among market
participants." The Act intends to create equal access to market knowledge
through an early publication of inside information. The central point thereof
is the publication and reporting duty of price-sensitive information first to a
Federal Supervisory Authority 45 and then to the public46 (ad-hoc publici7
4

ty).

2.

Market Supervision

The German Securities Trading Act establishes a new system of market
supervision with broad investigative powers for the federal authorities. It
thereby intends to supervise not only the enforcement of the insider trading
law, but also the reporting and disclosure duties. Supervision of the insider
trading prohibition is the duty of the newly created Federal Supervisory
Authority.4 This agency is directly subordinate to the Federal Ministry of
Finance. 49 Organizational matters and obligations of the Federal Supervisory Authority, such as cooperation with comparable foreign agencies, are
regulated in WpHG, Sections 3 through 11. Accordingly, in addition to
revealing insider violations, the Federal Supervisory Authority supervises

41. Id. §§ 38-40, at S.1759-60 (Criminal Offense and Misdemeanor Provisions).
42. See infra part IV.C.
43. WpHG § 15, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753-54) (Veriffentlichung und Mitteilung
kursbeeinfluJlender Tatsachen) (Publication and Reporting of Price-Sensitive Information)
[hereinafter Ad-Hoc Publicity].
44. Assmann, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5, at 527-28; Immenga, supra
note 5, at 205.
45. The German Bundesaufsichtsamt fir den Wertpapierhandel translates as Federal
Securities Trading Supervisory Authority [hereinafter Federal Supervisory Authority]. See
WpHG § 3, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S. 1750). More details about this agency are provided infra
part III.B.3.
46. See BECKER, supra note 5, at 78; DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 13.
47. WpHG § 15, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753-54). This article mostly focuses on the
suppressive measures of the Securities Trading Act. A brief introduction to the reporting and
disclosure duties arising from § 15 (Ad-Hoc Publicity) and § 21 (Mitteilungspflichten des
Meldepflichtigen) (Notification Requirements Applicable to the Notifying Party) is provided
infra part IV.A & B.
48. WpHG § 16, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1754) (Laufende Uberwachung) (Continuous
Supervision).
49. Id. § 3, at S.1750.
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compliance with the ad-hoc publicity requirement ° and the reporting and
publication obligation in case of changes in the holdings of voting rights in
exchange-listed companies. 51 Regarding certain requirements, the Federal
Supervisory Authority may consult with the domestic supervisory authorities
of regional exchanges.52
The presuppositions for the detection of insider violations are established
by reporting obligations of banks53 with regard to each securities transaction
and by the insider violation information rights54 of the Federal Supervisory
Authority. In order to supervise security issuers, the Federal Supervisory
Authority also has information rights against them.55 Security issuers must
comply with other reporting obligations, as well.56
German credit institutions, foreign credit institutions having a German
registered office or branch, and all foreign enterprises admitted to participate
in a German security exchange are required to report to the Federal
Supervisory Authority each transaction in securities or derivatives that is
admitted to over-the-counter trading5 7 or to a security exchange in Germany,
in the European Union, or in the European Economic Area.58 Furthermore,
this obligation also applies to transactions for which an application for
admission to trading on these markets of the involved shares or warrants has
been made or publicly announced. 59 Inasmuch as the Federal Supervisory
Authority has reason to believe that a violation of the insider trading
prohibition has occurred, it may require the involved banks and corporations6" to provide information regarding the suspicious transaction and
the parties involved.6 ' Based on this information right, the Authority is
permitted to enter the business office and premises of involved credit
50. Id. § 15, at S.1753-54.
51. Id. § 21, at S.1755; see CLAUSSEN, supra note 5, § 9;

SIEBOLD,

supra note 5, at 255;

Kompel, Financial Markets Supervision, supra note 5, at 230; Weber, Changing Situation,
supra note 5, at 2850.

52. The supervisory authorities include, for example, the exchange supervisory authorities
of the regional securities exchanges and the Bundesaufsichtsamtfiirdas Kreditwesen (Federal

Banking Supervisory Authority). WpHG § 6, v.26.7.1994 (BGB. I S.1751-52). For more
details with regard to the organization of the German financial markets, see Freis, supra note
4, at 6-7.
53. WpHG § 9, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1751-52).
54. Id. § 16(2) at S.1754.
55. Id. § 15(5), at S.1754.
56. This refers to the reporting obligations under § 15(2) & (4). Id. § 15(2) & (4), at
S.1753-54.
57. Freiverkehrsmarktincludes over-the-counter trading or unlisted trading.
58. EuropiaischerWirtschaftsraum (European Economic Area).
59. Id. § 9(1) sentence 2, at S.1752; see also Assmann, The New German Insider Law,

supra note 5, at 526; Peltzer, supra note 5, at 752.
60. The credit institutions and enterprises within the meaning of § 2(4) 1. WpHG § 2(4) 1.,
v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1750).
61. Id. § 16(2)-(3), at S.1754.
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institutions and enterprises. 62 Moreover, persons with actual knowledge of
inside information and issuers of insider securities (and their associated
enterprises) are required upon request to furnish the Authority with data
about this information and about persons who might have knowledge of this
information. 63 All persons, so identified, must then deliver the information
to the Authority. 64 It is important to note, however, that the Act provides
the right to withhold facts65 whose release would harm the above mentioned
persons or their relatives.
The penalties for violations of the Securities Trading Act vary according
to whether a violation qualifies as a misdemeanor or a criminal offense.
According to Section 39, violations of the ad-hoc publicity requirements, as
well as the refusal to provide information or to permit entry into business
offices,6 constitute a misdemeanor. 67 As such, they are punishable with
an administrative fine 61 of up to DM3,000,000. 69 The Federal Supervisory
Authority is the competent administrative authority obligated with the
detection and prosecution of misdemeanors.70
Contraventions of the insider trading prohibition qualify as a criminal
offense. 71 Accordingly, they are punishable with a fine or with imprisonment for up to five years. The Act does not distinguish between violations
committed by a primary insider and those committed by a secondary insider.
This equal treatment, in addition to the strict sanctions, are evidence of a
change of position by the German legislature: insider trading can no longer
be regarded as a gentleman's offense, but rather must be viewed as harmful
as fraud or similar dishonest dealings. 72 When compared with other
European countries, Germany has enacted one of the most stringent
punishment regulations. If any circumstance gives rise to suspicion of a
violation of the insider trading prohibition, the Federal Supervisory Authority
is required to notify the competent public prosecutor's office,74 which then

62. Id. § 16(3), at S.1754.
63. Id. § 16(4), at S.1754.
64. Id. § 16(5), at S.1754.
65. Id. § 16(6), at S.1754. For the conditions under which the right to withhold
information exists, see Siebold, supra note 5, at 263.
66. Both of them are required under § 16. WpHG § 16, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1754).
67. Id. § 39, at S.1759.
68. Geldbue (administrative fine).
69. Id. § 39(3), at S.1760; AssMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 39 para. 1.
70. WpHG § 40, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1760); Assmann, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 527; Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 810.

71. WpHG § 38, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1759).
72. Betrug (fraud); Untreue (dishonest dealing). See BECKER, supra note 5, at 75.
73. For more information, see SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 271.
74. Staatsanwaltschaft (public prosecutor's office).
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is in charge of further proceedings and investigations." An important factor
is the possibility under the Act of punishing violations by German citizens
in foreign countries of insider trading prohibitions under the same German
standard as domestic contraventions.7 6
B.

Definitions and Concepts
1. Inside Information

An essential term of the Securities Trading Act is "inside information."
According to Section 13(1), "inside information" is defined as "information
which has not been made public relating to, or to one or more issuers of,
insider securities which, if it were made known to the public, would be likely
to have a significant effect on the price of the insider security."" Without
the ability to qualify data as inside information, all of the Act's other
provisions relating to the insider trading prohibition cannot come into play.
Therefore, a detailed discussion is necessary to clarify, with relative certainty,
the legal meaning of this term.
"Information," as defined by the Act, is information about events or
circumstances that can be objectively scrutinized and verified. As such, it
differs from opinions, judgments, and evaluations, since they can only be
partially verified.7" Therefore, speculations and rumors cannot qualify as
"information." Declarations of intention are treated in a similar fashion. As
long as the impact of an event expressed in such a declaration depends on the
occurrence of certain other events or the taking of further measures, the
declaration does not constitute information, because it contains hypothetical
situations." In summary, "information" can be compared with the term
"fact"80 in the English language. Since the Act also speaks about tatsache,
"facts," which is the more commonly known term, it will be used interchangeably with "information" in the following explanations.
To qualify as inside information, the information must be unknown to the
public. It is not required, however, that it be treated as secret or confidential.s" According to the explanation provided by the German legislature,82
a fact is known to the public if knowledge of it is available to an unrestricted

75. Id. § 18(1).
76. Id. § 38(2).
77. This is the official Federal Supervisory Authority translation of § 13(1). For the
German text, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
78. BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at 46; Immenga, supra note 5, at 201.
79. See ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 36.
80. Taisache (fact).
81. SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 232; Assmann, The New German Insider Law, supra note

5, at 510.
82. BT-DRuCKS, supra note 24, at 46.
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number of people. More specifically, the German legislature regards a fact
as publicly known if the market participants, for example, professional
security traders or institutional investors, have the opportunity to take note
of it.83 This opportunity is more or less guaranteed if the facts are disseminated over information systems that are generally accessible throughout
the investment community, such as widespread exchange newspapers,
investment publications, and electronic news systems like Reuters."
The reduction of the definition of "information" by the German
legislature to the knowledge of market participants has not gone undisputed.8 5 It seems problematical that the extent of the knowledge
possessed by the broad spectrum of potential market investors appears to be
unimportant to the German legislature's definition of what constitutes
publicly known information, especially in light of the fact that the Securities
Trading Act was designed specifically to protect and encourage this group.
Therefore, the German legislature's decision results in a basis of informational knowledge between the broad investor group and the market
participants that is as uneven as the disparity in information that exists
between insiders and other investors. Some commentators thus propose that
a fact is not publicly known until it has been published in the mass media
and therefore, becomes available to the general public.
It should be noted, however, that the notification of a broad investor
group can be achieved only through the use of mass media such as daily
newspapers. Consequently, a relevant fact could remain unknown for a
period of at least twenty-four hours. However, investors who rely on weekly
investment magazines still would not be informed. Thus, the time lapse
between the dissemination of insider information and its actual publication,
making it available to the general public, would be at least one day and
perhaps as long as one week. Such a situation leaves the possibility of either
insider activities or trading restrictions on the persons involved during the
interval between dissemination and publication.
By reason of legal certainty and practicability, the decision of the
German legislature tends to be tenable. Indeed, the notification of market
participants is suitable for immediately regulating the market price of
securities and for avoiding insider trading. Consequently, the informational
requirement focusing on the market participants is sufficient to achieve the
objectives of the Act and to protect a broad spectrum of investors.
Furthermore, most investors in German exchanges are represented by market

83. This refers to the Bereichsoffentlichkeit (sector publicity). BT-DRUCKS, supra note
24, at 46; Immenga, supra note 5, at 202.
84. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 43; Caspari, supra note 5, at 539.
85. For more details about this discussion, see Assmann, Part II, supra note 5, at 241.
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86
participants and therefore would benefit at least indirectly.
Facts reported and published in compliance with the Act ease the inside
information qualification. However, this provision of the Act is not
immediately satisfied upon communicating the information to reporters,
analysts, or information system providers. Rather, information does not
these people, in turn, transmit the information
qualify as publicly known until
87
to the market participants.
Another requirement for the term "inside information" is the relation of
a fact to the issuer(s) of insider securities or to the insider securities
themselves. Facts that relate to one or more issuers may thereby have their
origin within or beyond the sphere of such issuers.8 According to the
Federal government's explanation89 to the Act, facts within the sphere of an
issuer include events such as the conclusion of important corporation
contracts,9" a new invention, or a capital reduction decision. A circumstance beyond the issuer's sphere might be a federal sale prohibition on one
of the issuer's produced goods. 91
Facts that relate to insider securities with respect to the price of such
securities include: the knowledge of a forthcoming, large stock disposition
and the buy/sell recommendations of analysts.92 Market information also
is covered under this criterion. 93 Market information can be defined as
information dealing with the condition of markets as a whole, not only with
regard to certain securities that obliquely affect the price of securities.94 A
decision of the Federal Bank95 about the official discount rate,96 natural
disasters like thunderstorms over grain-growing regions, or political
occurrences, such as the results of elections,9 7 can be considered market
information and eventually inside information.
Finally, an inside fact must have the potential to materially affect the
price of insider securities. The German legislature enacted this requirement

86. DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 18; Assmann, Part II, supra note 5, at 241;
Caspari, supra note 5, at 539; Immenga, supra note 5, at 202.
87. ASsMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 45; BECKER, supra note 5, at 64.
88. Kfampel, supra note 5, at n.14.104; Peltzer, supra note 5, at 749.
89. BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at 46.
90. The explanation explicitly mentions direct control contracts and agreements for the
transfer of profits. Id.
91. See ASsMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5,
supra note 5, at 17.

§ 13 para. 50; DEUTSCHE BORSE AG,

92. Caspari, supra note 5, at 540; Claussen, supra note 5, at 29-30; Schwarze, supra note
5, at 134; Tippach, supra note 5, at 1270.
93. BECKER, supra note 5, at 65; Assmann, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5,
at 513; Weber, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5, at 163.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Assmann, PartII, supra note 5, at 243; Immenga, supra note 5, at 202.
Bundesbank (Federal Bank).
Diskontsatz (official discount rate).
A more extensive list can be found in Tippach, supra note 5, at 1270.
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with the purpose of excluding minor occurrences. Consequently, facts whose
potential impact on the price of securities is minute will not be treated as
inside information, even though they may meet the previously described
standards.98 As clarified by the legislature, the adequately determined
possibility of influencing the price of insider securities satisfies this
requirement of the term "inside information." 99 Whether a possibility has
been adequately determined must be evaluated from an objective and
forward-looking point of view. It is not the subjective evaluation of the
person who has knowledge of such facts that is critical for this requirement.
Rather, the possibility that the fact will materially affect the price must be
foreseeable from the prospective of a reasonable third person." ° What is
not relevant is whether the price of an insider security actually changes after
the facts have become known because the insider trading prohibition is a
strict liability tort,'' which punishes based on the possibility of the
occurrence of certain events. 0 2
In question is when can a "material" effect on price be assumed, since
the Act itself does not contain a specific threshold. The legislature, however,
in its explanation refers indirectly0 3 to a provision contained in Section
8(1) of the "Conditions for Deals Concluded at German Securities Exchanges,''°4 where, for example, the materiality threshold for stocks would be
five percent.0 5
Scholarly publications, for the most part, support the German legislature's
proposal regarding the thresholds of the Act for determining what is
"material.' " Some authors propose alterations in the price of two
percent o7 and some propose alterations of ten percent' 0 8 (equal to a
98. BT-DRuCKS, supra note 24, at 46.
99. DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 20; see Weber, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 163 (discussing how significant a piece of information must be in order to
qualify as inside information).
100. For a more comprehensive explanation, see DEUTSCHE B6RSE AG, supra note 5, at
18.
101. Gefdhrdungsdelikt (strict liability tort).
102. Weber, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5, at 163.
103. Compare explanation to the Act, BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at 47.
104. Bedingungen fir Geschafte an den deutschen Wertpapierborsen § 8(1), KMR
[hereinafter Geschaftsbedingungen] (This is a set of rules issued by a self-regulating body that
regulates the course of business and which can be compared to the AMEX or NYSE.).
105. According to the Geschaftsbedingungen,supra note 104, § 8(1), brokers are obliged
to announce expected stock price changes of more than 5% that result from high trading
orders, with a single Plus or Minus notification. Id. For other securities, the threshold is
different. By explicitly mentioning a single Plus or Minus notification as a material price
alteration, the Federal government makes clear that it views the thresholds of § 8(1) as useful
guidelines. Id.
106. See, e.g., Assmarm, Part II, supra note 5, at 244; M6ler, supra note 5, at 106;

supra note 5, at 233-34.
107. See BECKER, supra note 5, at 66.

SIEBOLD,
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double-plus or double-minus notification) as "material," without, however,
convincingly explaining their reasoning. Still others generally object to the
adoption of strict figures and prefer a case-by-case evaluation, since such
numbers do not take into account the specific circumstances of each
09
case. 1
The figures of the Gesch4ftsbedingungen"° are a useful instrument for
determining specific thresholds for the term "material" because both the
Geschaftsbedingungen and the Securities Trading Act share the same
objective, namely to protect the equal chances of market participants by
establishing market transparency.'
Therefore, the single-plus or singleminus notification of the Geschiiftsbedingungen should be chosen as the
lowest thresholds, since there is no convincing reason why a huge trade
order, which undoubtedly qualifies as inside information, should be subject
to different thresholds specified in the two laws even though the laws have
the same intention. Furthermore, despite the fact that a case-by-case
evaluation admittedly would be the fairest solution, such a proposal must be
rejected by reason of legal certainty that must provide a potential insider with
a nominal definition of the term "material.".. 2 Therefore, in stock cases,
this would mean that a material effect on price would be possible with a five
percent alteration.
The determination of what inside information potentially will cause a
single-plus or-minus price variation still has to be done by each potential
insider. Although it is generally acknowledged that certain transactions
possess a potential to cause a price change, ultimately, it depends on each
individual case whether the information qualifies as information that may
materially affect the price." 3 For instance, the conclusion of merger or
acquisitions agreements, the purchase or sale of divisions, important
inventions, product liability suits, changes in equity balance positions, as well
as changes in the earnings expectations of enterprises, might have such a
potential,"' but the impact of each of these circumstances depends on the
size of the involved corporation. In summary, potential insiders have to rely
on their previous trade experience or the advice of their counselors, since

108. See, e.g., Claussen, supra note 5, at 30.
109. See, e.g., Peltzer, supra note 5, at 749; KOMPEL, supra note 5, at n.14.128.
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111. Compare Immenga, supra note 5, at 203.
112. AssMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 69; Jander & Zoberbier, supra note
5, at 808.
113. DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 19; Weber, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 164.
114. For a more comprehensive listing, see DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 26.
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guidelines" 5 have not yet been developed.
Section 13(2) of the Act limits the coverage of the above defined term
"insider information."
Accordingly, assessments that are compiled
exclusively on information known to the public will not be deemed inside
information, even if such assessments might materially alter the price of
insider securities. This part is especially important for security analysts and
business journalists, since the Act provides a safe harbor for their recommendations and analyses as long they only use information available to all market
6
participants.1
Similar to the German Securities Trading Act, "inside information" is
defined as material nonpublic information in U.S. laws." 7 The determination of materiality is not done with the use of strict thresholds, as have
been proposed for the German Act, but by the application of the materiality
standard expressed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."8 Under this
standard, a fact is material if its disclosure is likely to cause a substantial
change in the price of a security and if a "'reasonable man would attach
importance [to this fact] ...in determing his choice of action.' ""9 While
this definition is congruent with the German statutory language, a difference
exists in the approach towards the final determination of materiality. Instead
of using generally acceptable thresholds, an evaluation based on a case-tocase method is preferred in the United States. 20 The U.S. approach
towards the existence of the possibility of a material price alteration
resembles the discussion in the German Act.
In the United States, the definition of "nonpublic" information is, as it
is in Germany, based on the efficient capital market hypothesis.' 2 ' Thus,
disclosure to "market participants," that is, publication available to
marketplace traders instead of to a broad spectrum of investors, renders a fact
publicly known. 22 In summary, the German legislature seems to have
absorbed most of the experiences in the United States with regard to the

115. A possible guideline would be a chart, based on an empirical evaluation, that lists the
potential implications of certain events on enterprises within different ranges of sizes, assets,
shares, and so on.
116. Compare Assmann, Part H1,supra note 5, at 244, with M611er, supra note 5, at 106.
117. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847
(2d Cir. 1968).
118. 401 F.2d at 848.
119. Id. at 849 (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965)

(citations omitted).
120. See, e.g., Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1060 (2d Cir. 1985).
121. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (1996).
122. See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993); Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1980), consistent with Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at
833.
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definition of inside information. A minor difference exists only in the
approach towards the determination of materiality. Whereas the German
legislature obviously prefers the application of certain thresholds, the United
States has adopted a more case-by-case evaluation.
2.

Insider

The term "insider" restricts the personal applicability of the insider
trading prohibition. The broad formulation of Section 13 of the German
Securities Trading Act, however, qualifies every person or legal entity that
has knowledge of inside information as an insider.'2 3 The underlying
principle of Section 13 is the terminological differentiation between primary
insider, referred to only as "insider" in the statutory language, and secondary
insider, for which the Act in Section 14 uses the term "any third person."
important for the concrete restrictions of the insider
This distinction becomes
24
trading prohibition.
a. Primary
The term primary insider is distilled further in Section 13 of the Act as
persons who are primary insiders (1) by reason of their integrated intercompany relationship to the issuer of insider securities, 25 (2) by reason of their
participation in the share capital of an issuer, 126 or (3) by virtue of their
profession or their activity with the issuer.12 ' All of these groups also must
know facts that objectively qualify as inside information. It is not required,
recognize the inside information "quality" of the
however, that they actually
2
fact in their possession. 1
Although insider trading law in the United States does not recognize a
different statutory scheme for the three primary insider groups, it is widely
recognized that primary insiders 129 can only be persons who (1) have traded
in securities of a company (2) with which they stood in a fiduciary
relationship, (3) while in possession of inside information. 30 The deter-

123. BECKER, supra note 5, at 58; Assmann, The New German InsiderLaw, supra note 5,
at 504.
124. See infra part III.B.4.
125. WpHG § 13(1)1., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
126. Id. § 13(1)2., at S.1753.
127. Id. § 13(1)3., at S.1753.
128. Compare BECKER, supra note 5, at 59.
129. The term "primary insider" as found in the German Insider Law is the equivalent to
insiders who stand in a fiduciary relationship with the issuer of insider securities in the U.S.
insider terminology. For reasons of clarification, the German term also will be used in the
following discussion of U.S. insider law.
130. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT &
PREVENTION § 3.02, at 3-2 (Clark Boardmann Callaghan Securities Law Series, Rel. #3 7/94
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mination as to whether a person owes a fiduciary obligation to the corporation in whose securities he traded is not always a clear one. However,
nearly all of the groups mentioned in the German Act also could qualify as
fiduciaries of such a corporation under U.S. law. Thus, the coverage of both
laws is almost the same with respect to primary insiders. Some minor
differences are noted in the discussion below.
According to WpHG Section 13(1)1., a primary insider is a person who
as a member of the supervisory body' 3' or management body, 132 or as a
general partner133 of the issuer or an enterprise associated with the issuer, 134 save knowledge of inside information. The issuer's or enterprise's
organizational form is thereby irrelevant.'35 The only crucial factor is the
issuance of insider securities or association with such an enterprise. 3 6 This
category also is covered by the primary insider term under U.S. insider

trading law. 131

In question is whether a causal connection, between the acquaintance with
the inside information and the membership in such an issuer's body must
exist. Some commentators assume that the formulation "an insider is anyone
who as a member" was intended to cover only those persons who become
familiar with inside information because of their membership. 13' The
prevailing opinion, however, is that the language only requires the knowledge
of inside information, regardless of whether it was gained by sitting on such
139
a body or elsewhere.
The latter, prevailing doctrine should be approved. First, the legislature
has not implemented a causal connection requirement for this group, as it did
in Section 13(1)2.-3. In the latter sections, the German legislature expressly
decided to use the language "by virtue of" as such a requirement. By
omitting a similar expression in Section 13(1)1., it can be assumed that it was
the intention of the legislature not to require a causal connection for the
members of issuer's body and general partners.

1994). This is based on the landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
131. Aufsichtsrat (supervisory body).
132. Vorstand (management body).
133. PersOnlich haftender Gesellschafter (general partner).
134. Verbundenes Unternehmen (enterprise associated with the issuer).
135. They may be organized as corporations, limited liability companies, or limited
partnerships, for example.
136. DEUTSCHE BRSE AG, supra note 5, at 7; Assmann, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 505.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
138. Accord Weber, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5, at 159.
139. DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 7; SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 236-37; Claussen,
The New Insider Law, supra note 5, at 27. Only the purely private acquisition of inside
information is excluded. SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 237.
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Moreover, nearly all other countries with insider regulations have not
implemented a causal connection clause for such persons. Since the German
legislature wanted to achieve an internationally acceptable standard with its
insider prohibition, it would have been in conflict with this purpose to
construe such a requirement for a group that naturally deals with inside
information on a daily basis. Rather, it can be concluded from the Federal
government's explanation that even the slightest chance of insider dealing by
this group was to be avoided by qualifying them, based upon the knowledge
In summary, the mere
of inside information, as primary insiders.' 4
the members covered
qualifies
automatically
information
inside
knowledge of
4 ' In contrast thereto, in the
under Section 13(1)1. as primary insiders.
United States it seems to be recognized that such a causal link is required for
mandating the primary insider restriction on such persons. 142 Thus, despite
the fact that such persons would be subsumed under the primary insider term
in the United States, they would not be foreclosed from trading upon
knowledge gained outside their fiduciary position.
According to Section 13(1)2., primary insiders also include participants
in the share capital of the issuer or of an enterprise associated with the issuer.
A necessary prerequisite is that the capital participation was the cause of their
obtaining inside information. 143 A certain threshold of share participation
is not required. Therefore, small shareholders of large, publicly traded
corporations may be considered as primary insiders.'"
Some object to this proposition, arguing that the legislature should have
adopted a threshold for the protection of small shareholders. 4 Such a
proposal can be rejected on the ground that the legislature introduced a causal
requirement through the formulation "by virtue of," which in most cases that
Should the small
involve small shareholders will not be at hand.
shareholders, however, satisfy the requirement, no convincing argument can
be made why they should not be subject to the insider restrictions, since the
element of injustice in insider 'transactions, namely the intentional
exploitation of inside information, is present in insider trades of both
minority and majority shareholders." Conversely, U.S. insider trading law
assumes that only controlling shareholders qualify as primary insiders

140. See BT-DRucKs, supra note 5, at 46.
141. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
142. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 130, § 3.02, at 3-7, for further sources.
143. Compare Claussen, supra note 5, at 27, and Weber, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 159.
144. Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 807; DEUTScHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 7.
145. Accord Claussen, supra note 5, at 27.
146. Accord Assmann, Part I, supra note 5, at 239; Immenga, supra note 5, at 200; Jander
& Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 807.
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because only such persons are fiduciaries of a corporation.' 47 Noncontrolling stockholders are not in a fiduciary relationship with the corporation and
thus, are not subject to this term.'4 8 Consequently, they are only subject
to restrictions applicable to them as tippees. 149
Under the definition of Section 13(1)3. of the Act, persons who receive
knowledge of inside information in due course of their profession, activity,
or assignment also are covered under the primary insider term. The Federal
government's explanation mentions as potential primary insiders certified
public accountants, tax and business consultants, lawyers, and all employees
of like professions. 5 ° With respect to the professionals listed in Section
13(1)3., the legislature enacted a double-causal connection requirement.
First, they have to achieve knowledge of inside facts by virtue of their
occupation. Second, they additionally must be privy to the information in
due course. The latter restriction is of special importance, since it exempts
the accidental acquisition of inside information from qualification as a
primary insider. Consequently, a cab driver who coincidentally hears inside
information in the conversation of his passengers would not become a
primary insider. Even though he obtained the inside information by virtue
of his profession, he did not do so in the due course of his employment.
Furthermore, in contrast to situations covered under Sections 13(1)1.-2., the
group under discussion does not have to stay in any kind of relationship with
the issuer.'
Nonetheless, some commentators assume that primary
insiders as defined under Section 13(1)3. can only be persons who have a
contractual relationship with the issuer. This point of view, however, is not
convincing. First, such a restriction would conflict with the statutory
formulation that provides for "by virtue of" and "in due course" requirements, but not for a "contractual relation" provision. Second, this definition
of primary insider would not conform with Article 2(1), number 3 of the EU
Directive on Insider Dealing. 152 Finally, there is no reason why employees
of federal agencies like the Federal Cartel Office, who unquestionably have

147. See In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 60 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
148. See Cady, 60 S.E.C. at 911-12.
149. With regard to the requirements to be met for such a tippee liability, see infra part
III.B.4.a. & supra note 255. The term "tippee" in U.S. insider law covers persons who are
considered to be secondary insiders under German insider law if the tippee acquires
knowledge of inside information. Otherwise, he can not qualify as a secondary insider under
German Law.
150. For a qualification of additional professional groups, see BT-DRUCKS, supra note 5,
at 46.
151. Assmann, Part II, supra note 5, at 239; Caspari, supra note 5, at 538; Hopt, Legal
Problems, supra note 5, at 90-91.
152. See EU Directive 89/592, supra note 21, art. 2(1); Ruiz, supra note 21, at 236-37.
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access to inside information with a tremendous potential to affect prices'53
but do not have a contractual relationship with the issuer, should be exempt
from the insider trading prohibition."
The following examples illustrate what might be considered to be more
relevant groups who can be regarded as primary insiders under Section
13(1)3. Employees of the issuer or of an enterprise associated with the
issuer, such as junior managers below the management level, qualify as
primary insiders if they specifically and during their course of conduct as
specified in the employment contract acquire knowledge of inside information. For example, a curious secretary who reads transcripts designated
for her supervisor but not for herself cannot be regarded as a primary insider,
since she did not receive the insider information in due course. However, if
she receives the transcripts as addressed to her, the due course requirement
and therewith the primary insider position could be met.'55 Therefore,
under the German Securities Trading Act primary insiders may be managers,
as well as temporary employees or summer associates, on the other hand,
high-positioned lawyers in the legal department of the issuer may not be
subject to the primary insider term. In summary, a case-to-case evaluation
must be done, focusing on the responsibilities of each person and whether
inside information was obtained in due course.'56 United States insider
trading law applies almost the same analytical steps for employees of the
issuer: if an employee gained his knowledge in the course of his
employment, he will be treated as a primary insider. 5 7 Thus, both the
German and the U.S. securities laws lead to the same result. 5
The rules established under the German Act for those employed by the
issuer also can be applied to the persons with no regular employment
contract. Lawyers, tax consultants, and certified public accountants who have
a mandate with the issuer may be classified as primary insiders (as well as
their employees). The issue is again whether the issuer intentionally
provided these persons with the inside information, and whether they gained
this information during their professional work for the issuer. In the United
States, they are treated as "temporary" primary insiders.' 59 Similar to its
German counterpart, under U.S. securities law, an agency-like relationship

153. For instance, if a merger or acquisition agreement of two companies has to be
approved.
154. Accord Hopt, Legal Problems, supra note 5, at 91; Immenga, supra note 5, at 200.
155. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 22; DEUTsCHE BRSE AG, supra
note 5, at 8.
156. Assmann, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5, at 507.
157. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
158. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
159. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
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must exist in order to impose primary insider liability on such persons.' 6
An analyst or business journalist who receives an invitation to a factory
inspection and then gains inside information during a conversation with an
issuer might be considered to be a primary insider, since the information was
gained during his assignment and in due course from the issuer.' 61 Under
U.S. law, someone in this situation would be considered a temporary primary
insider, if he acquired the information in a forum where the issuer mandates
a fiduciary duty on them to keep it confidential or conversely to immediately
and widely publicize it. 62 However, these persons also must have
expressly or impliedly agreed to the imposition of such a duty.'63
Interestingly, relatives, family members, and close friends of primary
insiders who receive inside information in due course cannot be qualified as
primary insiders because the transfer of the information did not occur during
a professional or assigned relationship. Despite the fact that the qualification
of this group as primary insiders would be desirable," 6 the German
legislature failed to include them, and they are only subject to the secondary
165
insider restriction.
Employees of public agencies or institutions also may meet the
requirement of Section 13(1)3., even if they do not stand in any contractual
relationship with the issuer.6' Thus, employees of the Federal Statistical
Office 67 reporting the most recent inflation rate, officials of the Federal
Bank publishing the new official discount rate, 6 1 or investigators of the
Federal Environmental Agency
filing reports about violations against
Environmental Laws fulfill the requirements of Section 13(1)3.70 This is
equally true under U.S. law. Although such persons are not directly
fiduciaries of the issuer or its shareholders, under the "public trust theory,"
they do owe a fiduciary duty to the broad investor spectrum, since an unjust

160. See, e.g., SEC v, Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Whether the employees
of such persons also can be treated as primary insiders in the United States is a difficult
question since they receive the inside information not directly from the issuer, but from the
person to whom the information was dedicated.
161. KOMPEL, supra note 5, § 14.165; Assmann, PartII, supra note 5, at 239.
162. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655.
163. See SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
164. It is desirable because of the frequency with which these people will receive insider
facts and because different restrictions are applicable to primary and secondary insiders.
165. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 26; Weber, The New German
Insider Law, supra note 5, at 162.
166. See supra part III.B.2.
167. StatischtischesBundesamt (Federal Statistical Office).
168. Bundesbank (Federal Bank), Diskontsatz (official discount rate).
169. Bundesumweltamt (Federal Environmental Agency).
170. Compare ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para. 28, and Immenga, supra
note 5, at 201.
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enrichment situation is present.' 7 ' Hence, U.S. securities law comes to the
same conclusion as the German insider law.
b.

Secondary

With reference to Section 14(2) of the German Act, every third party
who has knowledge of inside information and cannot be subordinated to one
of the primary insider groups automatically assumes a secondary insider
position. The actual circumstances under which such a person gained
knowledge of inside information are not relevant. Accordingly, a person who
is intentionally told the information by a primary insider qualifies as a
secondary insider, as well as a cab driver or an industrial spy who discover
the fact by secretive listening. Similar to the primary insider discussion, the
secondary insider terminology of Section 14(2) only requires that the relevant
fact constitute inside information from an objective point of view. A person
who does not know that the information in his possession is "inside" in
nature assumes a secondary insider position as well. 172 Persons receiving
only a tip or buy/sell recommendation from insiders without any further
explanation do not become secondary insiders because they did not acquire
173
the insider information upon which the recommendation was founded.
In summary, the broad scope of the statutory formulation of the
secondary insider term functions as an "omnibus clause,"'7 intended to
cover every person with knowledge of facts that objectively qualify as inside
information. The doubtful extension of the secondary insider term to persons
who unknowingly possess inside information is limited by the phrase "based
on such knowledge," contained in the trading prohibition of Section
14(2). 71 This formulation indicates that a secondary insider must have
knowledge about the quality of the used information in order to have violated
the secondary insider restriction." Under U.S. laws, the above mentioned
group of secondary insiders are called "outsiders."' 177 The extension of the
insider obligation to such persons is not as easily available as it is under the
German statutory formulation. Rather, in the United States, the misap-

171. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 130, § 3.02, at 3-14.
172. BECKER, supra note 5, at 62; Assmann, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5,
at 508.
173. BECKER, supra note 5, at 63; Assmann, Part I, supra note 5, at 248; Immenga, supra
note 5, at 201. The primary insider giving such a recommendation is, however, punishable
under § 14(1)3.
174. Auffangstatbestand (omnibus clause).
175. DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 8; Weber, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 162.
176. DE TscHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 8; Weber, The New German Insider Law,
supra note 5, at 162.
177. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, 663.
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propriation theory has to be employed to cover insider trading by persons
who do not directly owe a fiduciary duty to the issuer of insider securities or
its shareholders. 7 ' This theory thereby imposes SEA Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 liability on an individual who "(1) misappropriates material
nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship
of trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities
transaction, (4) regardless
of whether he owed any duties to the shareholder
179
of the traded stock."'
3.

Insider Securities

The legislature has defined in Section 12 of the German Securities
Trading Act the scope of securities it intends to be protected by the insider
trading prohibition. The Act's formulation covers securities and derivatives.
a. Securities
All securities that are in accordance with Section 2(1) of WpHG and are
included or admitted to trading on a domestic market are automatically
insider securities.8 0 Referring to the statutory formulation of Section 2(1),
these securities are, on the one hand shares, 1 ' certificates representing
shares, debt securities,8 2 participation rights 8 3 and warrants,'8 4 and on
the other hand, securities comparable to shares or debt securities. The latter
formulation includes securities reflecting a membership right in an association
or federation.'85 All of these securities must be traded on a market that
operates on a regular basis and is accessible, whether directly or indirectly,

178. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
179. Clark, 915 F.2d at 443; United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995); see
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). The misappropriation theory is, however, not undisputed
between the different U.S. Courts of Appeals. While the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have adopted this theory, it was rejected in United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612
(8th Cir. 1996), by the Eighth Circuit as not being protected by the clear language of Section
10 (b) of the SEA and the legislative history thereto. For a comprehensive discussion of the
misappropriation theory, see David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation
Theory: The Awakening, 1995, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 487 (1997). For a discussion of this
theory after the recent O'Hagan decision, see Jonathan E.A. ten Oever, Insider Trading and
the Dual Role of Information, 106 YALE L.J. 1325 (1997); Kathryn Keneally, Ins and Outs
of Insider Trading, 21 CHAMPION 25 (1997).
180. WpHG § 12(1)1., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
181. Aktien (shares). Thereunder fall shares made out to the holder as well as registered
shares and not freely transferable registered shares.
182. Schuldverschreibungen (debt securities). They might be issued by either the
government or enterprises.
183. Genuflrechte (participation rights).
184. Optionsscheine (warrants)
185. Verband (federation, association). See ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 2
para. 6; STEBOLD, supra note 5, at 224.
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by the public.' 6 By this definition, for example, all securities that are
either admitted to German exchanges for the official listing 187 or the
regulated listing, s8 or included in the over-the-counter market"8 9 are
covered under the insider securities term.
Through Section 12(1) sentence 2, securities for which an application for
admission or inclusion has been made or publicly announced become subject
to trading restrictions as insider securities.'O An application is deemed to
have been made if the competent exchange receives it. The public
announcement requirement is satisfied by the availability of the information
to the market participants.' 9' Furthermore, insider securities are securities
that are admitted to trading in another Member State of the European
Community or another Contracting State of the Agreement on the European
Economic Area,192 subject to the market definition of Section 2(1) and to
Section 12(1) sentence 2.
The ability to punish insider trading in preferred or common registered
stock also is easily at hand under U.S. laws, since it is exactly this group of
the issuer's shareholders to whom the fiduciary obligation is owed. In the
case of debt securities, the situation is different. This contrariety can be
explained by the fact that it is arguable whether the insider's fiduciary
obligation also protects debt securities holders. Consequently, while the
German Act avoids such problems by explicitly including debt securities in
the insider securities term, U.S. laws probably have to apply the misappropriation theory to reach similar results.' 93
b. Derivatives
In addition to securities, derivatives are included in the insider securities
term. 194 However, the definition of "derivatives" in Section 12(2) and
Section 2(2) is not exactly the same as that of "securities." In contrast to
Section 2(2), all three categories of Section 12(2) mandate a relation of the

186. Compare the explanation of the Federal government, BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at
39.
187. Anderung des B~rsengesetzes (Stock Exchange Act) [hereinafter B6rsenG], § 36, as
amended by Zweites Finanzmarktfdrderungsgesetz, art. 2., v.26.7.1994 (BGB1. I S.1760).
Amtlicher Handel translates as "official listing." Id. The original Stock Exchange Act was
enacted in June 22, 1896.
188. Id. § 73 (Geregelter Handel).
189. Id. § 78 (Freiverkehr).
190. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 12 para. 3; Caspari, supra note 5, at 534.

191. BT-DRUCKS, supra note 5, at 45.
192. Id.
193. United States insider law reaches the same outcome with the application of the
misappropriation theory, which was briefly discussed at supra note 167. For a discussion of
this problem and a detailed citation list, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 130, § 3.03, at 3-18.
194. WpHG § 12(2), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
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derivatives of the former provision with securities.' 95 Therefore, derivatives priced on the alteration of foreign currencies or discount rates are not
considered insider securities, because the basis for securities is lacking.'96
Covered under the derivative term are rights to the subscription,
purchase, or sale of securities.'97 This can be the subscription right for
issuance of shares.'98 Put/call options also are contained under this
sentence. Moreover, rights entitling the holder to a payment of an amount
calculated on the basis of the performance of a securities basket are part of
the definition. 99 In addition, financial futures, 2 ° that is to say future
2°1
contracts
to rights
a share
or subscription,
bond index purchase,
or interest
futures
contracts,20 2 relating
as well as
for the
or sale
of
financial futures, are considered insider securities, provided that the subject
of such financial futures is securities or financial futures related to an index
that includes securities.2 3 Pursuant to Section 12(2)4., futures contracts
that provide a duty to purchase or sell securities are insider securities.2 °
These contracts, in contrast to put/call options, not only entitle but also
oblige the holder to purchase or sell specific securities.2 5
All the derivatives of Section 12(2), as well as the securities on which
the derivatives are based, must be admitted or included in a domestic market
as described above. An application for admittance or inclusion satisfies this
prerequisite, whereby a market, as defined in Section 2(1), of a Member State
of the European Community or another Contracting State of the Agreement
on the European Economic Area is equal to a German market. It is not
required, though, that both the derivative and the security be admitted in one
and the same country.20 6 In the United States, insider trading in options is
prohibited by Section 20(d) of the SEA.20 7 Thus, the German and U.S. acts
both arrive at the same result, although the U.S. approach causes some
conceptual problems with the requirement of an existing fiduciary duty

195. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 12 para. 8; BECKER, supra note 5, at 69.
196. Compare Caspari, supra note 5, at 534.

197. WpHG § 12(2)1., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
198. Aktienemission (issuance of shares). BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at 45.
199. WpHG § 12(2)2., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753). For a more comprehensive
discussion, see BECKER, supra note 5, at 70; BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at 45.
200. Finanzterminkontrakte (financial futures).
201. Terminkontrakte (future contracts).
202. Zinsterminkontrakte (interest futures contracts).

203. WpHG § 12(2)3., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
204. Id. § 12(2)4.
205. Id. As an example, the bond-future contract traded at the Deutsche Termin B6rse
(German Futures Exchange) falls under § 14(2)4.
206. Compare Caspari, supra note 5, at 536.

207. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d).
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between the seller of the option and the insider.
4.

°8

Prohibition of Insider Dealing

The insider trading prohibition is formulated in Section 14 of WpHG.
The prohibition regulation of this provision differentiates between
primary209 and secondary insiders.210
a. Pertainingto PrimaryInsiders
Pursuant to Section 14(1), a primary insider, based on his knowledge of
inside information, may not purchase or sell insider securities "for [his] own
account or for the account or on behalf of a third party.""' In addition, a
primary insider may not make this information available to another person
without authorization.212 Finally, a primary insider is prohibited from
recommending trades in insider securities to another person if the recommendation is based on inside information.2 3 The phrase "for [his] own account
or for the account ...of a third party" 214 of the statutory formulation refers
to transactions in which the primary insider makes his own investment
decisions for his account or the account of one of his customers. The phrase
"on behalf of a third party" refers to trades in which the primary insider
executes orders as an agent of a third person. This might be, for example,
the employer of the primary insider.215
It is important to note that the criterion "to purchase" or "to sell" only
covers judicial acts in the form of an active transaction. "Nonselling" or
"nonpurchasing decisions," however, are not included under these restrictions.
This leads to the unsatisfactory situation where a primary insider who, after
receiving inside information that security Xs price will rise because of
certain specified circumstances, decides not to sell his X security, does not
violate the insider trading prohibition, even though prior to receiving the
inside information he had intended to sell security X.
This gap in the provision has been widely criticized, since both the
nonperformance and performance of an act, based on the knowledge of inside

208. The seller of options is not necessarily a shareholder of the issuer of the underlying
security. Hence, the insider does not always owe a fiduciary duty to such seller.
209. WpHG § 14(1), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753) (described as "insiders").
210. Id.§ 14(2), at S.1753 (described as "any third person").
211. Id.§ 14(1)1., at S.1753.
212. Id.§ 14(1)2., at S.1753.
213. Id.§ 14(1)3., at S.1753.
214. Id.§ 14(1)1., at S.1753.
215. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 para. 14; BECKER, supra note 5, at 49.
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information, contain the same element of inequity.2" 6 It is recognized,
however, that even if the Securities Trading Act had contained such a
provision, in practice, it would have been impossible for prosecutors to
produce sufficient evidence to satisfy their burden of proof. For this reason,
despite the fact that it would have been sound from a theoretical point of
view to include a provision covering nonselling or nonpurchasing, the Act's
limitation to affirmative acts seems justifiable. 7
Of decisive significance is the meaning of the phrase "on the basis of
[his] knowledge of inside information ' as the subjective element of the
insider trading prohibition, since only the presence of both the subjective and
the objective part219 finally leads to a punishable violation of the insider
trading restriction. The exact definition of this subjective requirement is
unfortunately not enunciated in the Act. The legislature nevertheless
expressed its opinion in its explanation of the Act.220 Pursuant to it, the
requirement "on the basis of [his] knowledge" should be affirmed if the
primary insider uses the information to the advantage of himself or others
with the hope and goal of gaining an economic benefit, which commonly
would be despised as a moral infringement of the equal opportunities for all
investors. Hence, this provision requires that a deliberate, economic benefit
be possible from the use of inside information.221 In other words, the
primary insider first must have the knowledge that he actually used inside
information. Second, he must have the intent of utilizing this inside
information for his own or a third party's benefit. 2' However, it is not
required that the primary insider actually gain economic advantage from the
insider transactions.2 23
In summary, a primary insider must possess intent with regard to all
elements of the insider trading prohibition. Therefore, a primary insider who
wrongly assumes that the inside facts do not meet the Act's criteria on
affecting price or who assumes that the facts are already publicly known is
not committing a violation of the insider trading restriction when he

216. Accord Claussen, supra note 5, at 31; Hopt, European& German Insider Law, supra
note 5, at 45.
217. BECKER, supra note 5, at 50; Assmann, Part II, supra note 5, at 246. Likewise, §
14(1)2.-3. does not cover the nonperformance of the therein described actions. Such an
omission can be explained, however, with the same reasons as given for § 14(1)1.
218. WpHG § 14(1)3., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
219. The objective part is the occurrence of transactions in insider securities. In § 14(1)2.3., the objective part is the disclosure of inside information to others, respectively the
recommendation of transactions to third persons. Id. § 14(1)2.-3.
220. Compare BT-DRUCKS, supra note 5, at 47.
221. Immenga, supra note 5, at 204; Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 808.
222. Claussen, supra note 5, at 31.
223. Assmarm, PartII, supra note 5, at 246; Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 808.
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concludes transactions in insider securities based on his knowledge.2 24 The
statute expressly mentions that acting on one's own entrepreneurial decisions,
even if founded on special knowledge, does not violate Section 14, as long
as the decision was not influenced by otherwise, unlawfully accumulated
insider facts.225
A primary insider will generally fall under an abstention or disclosure
duty under U.S. insider laws. 226 Thus, insider trading by which the insider
attempts benefit his own account or the account of others automatically leads
to an insider violation.227 What is arguable is the motivation that is
necessary for a primary insider to be considered to have committed unlawful
conduct, or to put it into the language of the German Act, whether the
primary insider must have conducted a trade based on his knowledge of
inside information. In the United States, the law is unclear with respect to
this question. However, the statutory formulation chosen in Section
21A(a)(1) of the SEA seems to indicate that the mere possession of inside
information invokes the abstention rule, without requiring an additional
causal requirement, 22' as is contained in the German Act. Interestingly, the
U.S. law faces the same problem as its German counterpart in the case of
nontrading based on the knowledge of inside information. Hence, a director
who changes his previous intention to sell stock after learning that his
than expected cannot be punished under
corporation's performance was better
229
law.
insider
U.S.
or
German
either
As mentioned previously, official exchange brokers can be regarded as
a professional group who typically would qualify as primary insiders, since
they are confronted regularly with orders that might be determined as inside
information. Their qualification as a primary insider is therefore not
problematic. More important is the question of which broker deals will
trigger the insider trading prohibition, because a primary insider can still
conclude securities transactions as long as he does not make use of his
insider knowledge. Hence, if an exchange broker is consulted regarding a
plain order to buy stock from corporation X, he does not violate the insider

224. Since the Securities Trading Act does not regulate the negligent commission of an
insider restriction violation, the primary insider in the illustrated example cannot be punished
under the Act. See ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 para. 19 (discussing this point
in detail).
225. Compare BT-DRuCKS, supra note 24, at 47. Accord SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 240;
Assmann, PartIf, supra note 5, at 246; Caspari, supra note 5, at 542; Moller, supra note 5,
at 106.
226. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
227. See, e.g., Tome, 638 F. Supp. at 596.
228. LANGEVOORT, supra note 130, § 3.04, at 3-22; 15 U.S.C. 78u-l(a)(1).
229. See Steven R. Salbu, Tipper Credibility, Noninformational Tippee Trading, and
Abstentionfrom Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the Insider TradingLaws, 68 WASH. L. REv.
307, 333 (1993).
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trading prohibition, even if he qualifies a primary insider, since the
transaction is taking place without the use of inside information.230
However, if the exchange broker receives an order that allows him to
make the final investment decision of when security X has to be purchased,
and the broker has insider facts about this security, then he undoubtedly will
commit a violation of the insider trading prohibition. Therefore, he has to
return orders that require him to make his investment decisions based on
inside information that he possesses about the security to be traded. Another
point of view contends that the broker should be permitted to execute the
order if he could have come to the same investment decision by having used
his market experience rather than his insider knowledge. 23' This proposal
should be rejected as impracticable, since it would be impossible to verify
that the investment decision was not based, at least in part, on inside
information. Similarly, the Federal government's solution whereby such a
broker simply should pass on the order to a colleague is not viable for two
reasons. First, the colleague to whom the order is passed also might be in
possession of insider facts. Second, the transfer of an order would indicate
to the colleague that relevant and unknown information exists about the
security that might substantially affect its price. Thus, the transfer of the
order would come very close to an infraction of Section 14.232
A classic example of insider trades covered by the insider trading
restriction is front running. Front running exists if brokers or security
dealers, confronted with voluminous and therefore price relevant dispositions
of a certain security, make their own trades in the security prior to the
execution of the order, thereby utilizing their inside knowledge about its
disposition. In order for a violation of Section 14 to occur, the disposition
must, of course, have the potential of altering the price.233
Section 14 does not apply to "scalping." Scalping applies to cases in
which buy/sell recommendations are publicly announced, and the recommender, normally a business journalist or an analyst, deals in the recommended securities prior to the announcement in order to profit from an
expected subsequent price alteration.
Although scalping is ethically
intolerable, it is not covered under the insider trading prohibition, since the
recommender is merely realizing his own investment decision. The fact that
he subsequently causes other persons to follow his advice does not convert
his investment decision into inside information. Obviously, if the recommen-

230. This is the explanation of the Federal government as contained in BT-DRUCKS, supra
note 24, at 47.
231. Accord Claussen, supra note 5, at 29.
232. Accord Weber, The New German Insider Law, supra note 5, at 161.
233. Compare Ktlnpel, Inside Information,supra note 5, at 2139, and BECKER, supra note
5, at 54.
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dation were based on information available only to the recommender, he
could be called to account under Section 14 .2 4
Section 14(1)2. furthermore punishes the disclosure or the "making
available" of inside information without permission. The term "making
available" means passively providing facts to third persons. Hence, if the
primary insider creates a situation under which a third party can acquire the
insider facts, he fulfills the "making available" requirement of Section
14(1)2., even without having actively given the information to the third
party.235 The legislative explanation2 36 to the Act gives as an example
of "making available" the situation where a primary insider communicates a
password to a third person by which the latter gains access to restricted data
systems containing inside information. Of specific importance is under what
circumstances a disclosure or accessibility is unauthorized-within the statute's
meaning, since it is only then that the primary insider commits unlawful
conduct. The explanation to the Act states that unlawful disclosure or
accessibility is deniable if the inside information was given or made available
within the regular course of conduct required by the primary insider's
profession or employment.2 37 It has to be acknowledged, however, that not
every transmission of such information made within the regular course of
conduct can be regarded as permissible, since it is the Securities Trading
Act's objective to keep the number of potential insiders as small as
possible. 238 For this reason, only inside information transfers that are
absolutely required from an operational or assignment-based point of view
are in compliance with Section 14(1)2.239 Therefore, enterprises are
strongly encouraged to create "Chinese walls" to ensure that only those
people for whom it is essential receive the insider information.2" The
transmission of inside information to persons outside the business or
enterprise, for example, to lawyers, certified public accountants, or exchange
officials, is permissible only if it is necessary because of a legal obligation
or can be justified by compelling business reasons.24' Moreover, only the
actual possession by the third party of the insider facts made available to the
third party constitutes the statutory definition of Section 14(1)2. Therefore,
the primary insider does not commit a violation of the insider trading

234. Compare ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 para. 34.
235. Immenga, supra note 5, at 204; M611er, supra note 5, at 107.
236. BT-DRUCKS, supra note 24, at 47.
237. Id.
238. Compare Assmann, Part11, supra note 5, at 247.
239. This is the prevailing opinion. See DEUTsCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 11;
Assmann, Part11, supra note 5, at 247; Immenga, supra note 5, at 204; Jander & Zoberbier,
supra note 5, at 808.
240. Compare DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 11.
241. Assmann, The New German InsiderLaw, supra note 5, at 520.
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prohibition if the third party does not receive the insider facts given to him
or receives them incorrectly, or if the third party already has knowledge of
such facts.242 The intent of the primary insider has to cover the recognition
of facts as inside information as well as the receipt of the inside information
by a third person. 243
An unlawful disclosure can occur during discussions or presentations of
company representatives with journalists or analysts. In many cases, during
these conversations, company representatives mention facts that are not
publicly known. Thus, they will commit a legal offense if they do not
expressly convey the inside information to the group of journalists and
analysts with the obligation that they immediately publish the information. 2" In the event that the company representatives transfer this duty
to the persons present, the latter are prohibited from concluding any
transaction in the affected securities prior to the publication of the inside
245
facts.
With regard to shareholder meetings, commentators question whether the
chief executive officer 246 or other members of the senior management
board 247 of a corporation violate Section 14(1)2. if they comply with their
duty under the Corporation Act to answer shareholder questions. 48 Such
a violation could occur since the members of the management board qualify
as primary insiders under Section 13(1)1., and the shareholders of the
corporation would be the "other persons" of the unlawful disclosure provision
of Section 14. Therefore, answering a shareholder question could constitute
a violation of this provision if the response contained inside information.
The response could not be treated as a permissible publication of inside
information under Section 15 (ad-hoc publicity) because the shareholders
present constitute only a restricted forum.24 9 Consequently, members of the
board would be forced to make use of their right not to respond 20 if the
answer would commit a legal offense.
Hence, some commentators propose that responses of members of the

242. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 paras. 44-45. This can be explained by
the fact that the attempt to commit the criminal offense of § 14 is not punishable.
243. Id. § 14 para. 67.
244. For more information, see DEUTSCHE B1RSE AG, supra note 5, at 11.
245. The transaction renders them secondary insiders. Compare Schwarze, supra note 5,

at 128.
246. Vorstandsvorsitzende (chief executive officer).
247. Vorstand (senior management board).

248. The members of the management body are forced under § 131 of the Corporation Act
to answer questions of shareholders who invoke this provision. AktG § 131, v.6.9.1965
(BGBI. I S.1089-1185).
249. See Joussen, supra note 5, at 2486, for a more comprehensive illustration.
250. Auskunfisverweigerungsrecht (right to reject to answer to a shareholder question)
pursuant to AktG § 131(3) & (5), v.6.9.1965 (BGBI. I S.1089-1185).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/7

32

1996]

GERMAN SECURITIES MARKET

Memminger: The New German Insider Law: Introduction and Discussion in Relati

management board to shareholder questions during a shareholder meeting
should be treated as authorized and thus, not in violation of Section 14(1)2.
because the goal of the Act is to protect shareholders by providing them with
adequate information. For this reason, it would be contraobjective of the Act
if shareholders could not receive answers to their questions because of a too
narrow interpretation of the unlawful disclosure provision. 5 ' In accordance
with another opinion, the management board's response would qualify as an
illegal disclosure that could not be justified by the right of shareholders to
pose questions and have them answered. Therefore, the members of the
management would be entitled not to answer such questions in order to avoid
criminal actions against themselves.2 52
Unquestionably, the Securities Trading Act attempts to accomplish
effective shareholder protection. It is, however, not limited to the protection
of shareholders of only one corporation. Rather, all shareholders and all
potential investors have to be taken into account. Thus, if the disclosure of
inside information during the shareholder meeting of corporation X is treated
as legally permissible, all other investors who are not shareholders of X, as
well as the shareholders of X not participating in the shareholder meeting,
would be discriminated against. Furthermore, the informational rights of
shareholders with regard to inside information are already satisfied through
the ad-hoc publicity requirement under Section 15. Consequently, the second
opinion, whereby management responses containing inside information would
qualify as unauthorized and in violation of Section 14(1)2., should be given
preference.2 3
Business journalists potentially could violate the unlawful disclosure
provision. Undoubtedly, they are not in conflict with this regulation if they
write articles recommending certain securities, and their recommendation is
based on publicly 2' known facts. In the case where business journalists
receive inside information, however, they must be aware that publication of
this information is permissible only if the publication is made available to all
market participants. Transmission of inside information to a restricted group
of people constitutes a legal offense pursuant to Section 14(1)2.-3.
In the United States, liability for unlawful disclosure by primary insiders
arises, for example, out of tipper-tippee liability. In the United States, a
tippee violates insider laws if (1) the insider gives the tippee inside
information, and the insider therewith seeks to benefit personally, and (2) the

251. See Benner-Heinacher, supra note 5, at 766 (supporting this view).
252. See Joussen, supra note 5, at 2489; Kalmpel, Inside Information, supranote 5, at 2138.
253. For discussions reaching the same result, but with minor differences in the analytical
steps leading to it, see ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 para. 51; Joussen, supra
note 5, at 2486; Kfimpel, Inside Information, supra note 5, at 2138.
254. "Publicly" is defined as publicly known to the market participants.
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insider thus breaches his fiduciary loyalty to the issuer, with (3) the tippee's
actual or constructive knowledge of the breach. If these conditions are met
by the tippee, then both he and the primary insider automatically become
subject to insider liability. 5 Furthermore, under U.S. law, in a tender
offer context, Rule 14e-3 of the SEA prohibits the offering person, whether
he is the issuer, or any officer, director, employee, advisor, or anybody else
acting on behalf of the above mentioned group, from communicating
material, nonpublic information relating to the tender offer.256 A safeharbor exemption exists for good faith communications required by law or
for business purposes.2 7
Finally, under the German Act primary insiders also are excluded from
recommending to another person the purchase or sale of insider securities if
the recommendation is based on inside information.2 58 The purpose of this
regulation is to prevent evasion of the insider trading prohibition through the
interaction between primary insiders and third persons. 259 The term
"recommending" used in Section 14(1)3. of WpHG differs from "disclosure"
as mentioned in Section 14(1)2. in the following respect: in a disclosure, the
insider facts themselves are revealed to the third person, whereas a
recommendation only provides a trading tip stating what or what not to do
without actually disclosing the insider facts upon which the recommendation
is grounded. 6°
The clear statutory formulation of Section 14(1)3. does not cover the
dissuasion of third persons from making a previously intended transaction.2 6' Thus, a primary insider does not violate this regulation if he gives
a third person a hint not to execute an order that the third party had intended
to execute before receiving the tip from the insider. The adoption of a clause
prohibiting the dissuasive tip, however, appears to be necessary, since the Act
as it stands clearly contains a regulatory leak that can and most likely will
be exploited by savvy primary insiders and their customers. U.S. insider law
is, in this respect, quite similar. Although the German Act distinguishes
between the disclosure of inside information and the giving of a mere tip,
U.S. law applies the tipper-tippee liability in both situations, with the result

255. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646 (stating the requirements for tipper-tippee liability).
256. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(l)-(2) (1998).
257. Id. § 240.14e-3(d)(l)(i)-(iii). An example of such a business purpose is the communication of such information to persons involved in the planning or financing of the tender
offer or in actions of the issuer in response to the tender offer.
258. WpHG § 240.14(1)3., v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
259. Immenga, supra note 5, at 204; Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 808; Weber,
Changing Situation, supra note 5, at 2853.
260. Compare DEUTSCHE B6RSE AG, supra note 5, at 11.
261. ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 para. 72.
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262
being the same as that in Germany.
By virtue of their profession, analysts usually face the danger of
Although
noncompliance with the prohibition of recommendations.
are
facts
recommendations pursuant to analyses of already known
263 the rendering of advice based on information revealed only to
protected,
the analyst or a small group of analysts constitutes a violation of Section
14(1)3. Consequently, if an analyst receives new information about an
enterprise during a presentation by the representatives of the enterprise, he
then qualifies as a primary insider, since the disclosure occurred during the
analyst's activity in due course. Consequently, he needs to be very careful
about his future proceedings.2 6 If he wants to utilize this newly gained
information when making a recommendation, he must make sure that the new
facts are first published and available to all market participants before
releasing his advice.265

b. Pertainingto Secondary Insiders
According to Section 14(2) of the Act, a secondary insider is prohibited
from purchasing or selling insider securities "for his own account or for the
account of or on behalf of others[,]" as long as the transaction is grounded
on inside information."6 With regard to the definition of the various
elements of this provision, this article refers to its previous explanations
provided for primary insiders, since the meaning of the elements of both
provisions is congruent.
Like primary insiders, secondary insiders must have intent with regard
to all the requirements of Section 14(2).267 Pursuant to this section, the
ability to prosecute a secondary insider who receive inside information from
primary insiders and subsequently conclude transactions in insider securities
must be denied if the secondary insider has assumed in good faith that the
insider facts were already publicly known. The fact that persons obtaining
recommendations from primary insiders do not qualify as secondary insiders
because they do not retain knowledge of insider facts themselves 2is
6
important. Such persons are not legally excluded from utilizing the tip. 8
However, the primary insider who gives the recommendation is punishable

262. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646.
263. WpHG § 13(2), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
264. This is the prevailing opinion. See ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 13 para.
24; Caspari, supra note 5, at 538; M6ller, supra note 5, at 104; Schwarze, supra note 5, at
128.
265. Caspari, supra note 5, at 538; Schwarze, supra note 5, at 128.
266. WpHG § 14(2), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
267. Assmann, Part II, supra note 5, at 248; Immenga, supra note 5, at 204.
268. Compare ASSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 14 para. 74.
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under Section 14(1)3. In addition, it is not necessary for secondary insiders
to know which primary insider gave them the inside information, since the
definition of the secondary insider term refers to the knowledge of the inside
information itself.269
The prohibition regulation for secondary insiders does not contain a
disclosure or recommendation restriction as is defined for primary insiders.
Therefore, such a course of conduct cannot be prosecuted directly under the
German insider law. ° For this reason and in recognition of an otherwise
existing regulatory leak, the German Federal Council,2 71 during the
enactment process of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act, proposed
to amend the drafted insider law with a provision prohibiting disclosures and
recommendations for secondary insiders.272 This proposal, however, was
rejected by the Federal government without further explanation. Nevertheless, secondary insiders who transmit inside information to third persons
can be prosecuted under general joint offender27 3 and accomplice27 4 principles of German criminal law,275 because the third person will then
become a secondary insider as well and will be subject to the same
transaction prohibition as the first secondary insider.
Concededly, a loophole exists for a secondary insider's recommendation
to another person. The other person cannot be qualified as a secondary
insider because he is unaware of the inside information. Consequently, the
third party is free to exercise the tip, without any the threat of prosecution
against him or the secondary insider advising him in the transaction. This
situation can hardly be reconciled with the objective of the Securities Trading
Act, namely to prevent insider trading and thereby strengthen the German
financial markets. From the perspective of outside investors and their
expectation of fair dealing, it is probably irrelevant whether a secondary
insider concludes the transaction or causes another person to conclude the
transaction. Either method will be regarded as unfair to outside investors and
therefore, destroy their trust in the German financial markets. One can only
hope that the German Federal government will become fully aware of this
unacceptable situation and amend the Act before the regulatory leak causes
more harm to the confidence of outside investors.2 76

269. Compare Caspari, supra note 5, at 546, and AsSMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5,
§ 14 para. 77.
270. Immenga, supra note 5, at 204; Jander & Zoberbier, supra note 5, at 808.
271. Bundesrat (federal council).
272. BT-DRucKs, supra note 24, at 94.
273. Mittdter (joint offender).
274. Teilnehmer (accomplice).
275. §§ 25-27 StGB (Strafgesetzbuch) (Criminal Code).
276. Accord SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 244; Assmann, The New German InsiderLaw, supra

note 5, at 522. It furthermore has to be noted that most of the other European States decided
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United States insider laws, as regulated through Rule 1Ob-5 and Rule
14e-3 of the SEA, the latter of which is applicable in a third-party tender
offer context, 2" are in many respects similar to the coverage of the
secondary insider prohibition in Germany. Generally, Rule lOb-5 extends the
obligations of primary insiders to persons who do not stand in any fiduciary
relationship to the issuer of the insider securities.278 These persons are
called "outsiders" in U.S. insider law terminology.279 The coverage of
outsiders is made possible through the application of the misappropriation
theory.28 ° Since the duties applicable to outsiders are nearly the same as
those for insiders,2"' this article will refer to previous explanations of
primary insiders.
One plain distinction between the German and U.S. secondary insider
regulation should be mentioned here. While the statutory language of the
German insider regulation leads to a direct, unquestionable prohibition for
outsiders, its U.S. counterpart must employ the misappropriation theory with
a necessary relationship of trust and confidence between the primary and
secondary insider in order for the behavior to be punishable. 282 Therefore,
under German insider regulation, someone who secretly listens to conversations that contain inside information and later makes securities trades based
upon this knowledge would definitely violate the German insider trading
prohibition, whereas this would not necessarily be true under U.S. insider law
because of the lack of confidence and trust between the person who
overheard the information and the insider.
In the United States, Rule 14e-3 of the SEA contains an acquisition and
recommendation prohibition283 for persons who would be defined as
secondary insiders under German insider law. However, instead of using the
secondary insider terminology, the Rule defines such people as those who are
"in possession of material information relating to [a] tender offer [by another
person] which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic. '' 28' Furthermore, the information has to be acquired directly or
indirectly from (a) "a person who has taken a substantial step or steps to

to implement equal insider trading prohibitions for both primary and secondary insiders.
277. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)(l-3).
278. Id.; O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616.
279. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616. Under German insider law, such persons are generally
called secondary insiders. Accordingly, "outsider" and "secondary insider" will be used
interchangeably.
280. For a short discussion of the theory, see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
281. "Insiders" in the terminology of the Act. This group would be called primary insiders
in Germany.
282. Clark, 915 F.2d at 443; ten Oever, supra note 179, at 1326-28.
283. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
284. Id.
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commence or has commenced a tender offer,"2 85 (b) the issuer of the
securities being subject of the tender offer, or (c) any officer, director,
employee, or other person acting on behalf of the offering person or the
issuer.' 86 These "secondary insiders," similar to those in the German
provision, do not have to stand in any kind of a fiduciary duty to the offering
person or the issuer.287
The restriction provided for secondary insiders is hereby more complete
than the German provision, since Rule 14e-3 prohibits not only acquisitions
made by such persons directly, but also recommendations and tipping that
lead to the acquisition of the securities.2" These secondary insiders can,
however, avoid conflicts with the SEC if they publicly disclose the material
information in a press release within a reasonable amount of time.2 89 Thus,
any transaction caused directly or indirectly by such persons is covered under
Rule 14e-3, thereby avoiding the loopholes of its German counterpart.
c.

Sanctions of Violations

Violations of the insider trading prohibition promulgated in Section 14
of the German Securities Trading Act are punishable under Section 38.
Pursuant to this provision, they shall be adjudged with a fine or imprisonment of up to five years.2" With this relatively high sentence, in comparison to other German business offense provisions, Germany has one of the
highest penalties in the European Union.29 ' Despite the fact that the insider
trading restriction distinguishes between primary and secondary insiders,
Section 38 does not contain different treatment provisions for the two groups.
Consequently, once a secondary insider has committed a violation of Section
14, he is adjudged under the same standard and with the same high sentences
as are available for primary insiders. This seems to be consistent with the
intention of the Act, since insider dealing of both primary and secondary
insiders must be treated as immoral acts, endangering the reputation and

285. Such a person is called an "offering person." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
286. Id.
287. The avoidance of such a requirement in Rule 14e-3 is, however, challenged as an
excess of the rulemaking authority of the SEC in O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 612, which is pending
now in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. The outcome of this case is of interest, since the
omission of a fiduciary duty requirement was contested without merits in SEC v. Peters, 978
F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992), in which the U.S Court of Appeals upheld the SEC Rule and thus
reversed the district court's holding.
288. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3.
289. Id.
290. WpHG § 38(1), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1759).
291. For instance, the statutory definition of Kapitalanlagebetrug(fraud involving capital
investments) only contains imprisonment for up to three years. § 264a StGB. Compare
Assmann, Part 1H, supra note 5, at 250.
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credibility of the German financial markets.292
As previously stated, an attempt to use insider information, a violation
of Section 14, is not punishable, since Section 38 does not provide sanctions
for such an act.293 Pursuant to Section 38(2), any violation of a regulation
under the law of a foreign country that corresponds to a German regulation
listed in Section 38(1) shall be punishable in Germany. Therefore, any
German citizen who commits insider trades in the United States that violate
the U.S. SEA and the Rules promulgated thereunder can be punished by
penalties as provided for infrinGerman courts with the same 2stringent
94
gements of German insider law.
IV.

DISCLOSURE AND REPORTING DUTIES

In addition to its prohibitive measurements, the Securities Trading Act
also regulates reporting and disclosure duties designed to quickly provide
important information to the investment market, thereby reducing the risks
of insider trade occurrences. These publication duties are contained in
Section 15 (Ad-hoc Publicity) and Section 21 (Reporting of voting Rights
Changes).
A.

Ad-Hoc Publicity

Pursuant to Section 15(1) of the Act, issuers of securities that are
admitted to official trading or to the regular market at a German exchange
are obliged to report and disclose new, unknown circumstances that relate to
the assets, financial condition, or business performance of the issuer and
might materially affect the price of such securities. This disclosure is known
as ad-hoc publicity. The definition of the term securities is the same as that
for "insider securities" in the insider trading prohibition.295 In contrast to
the insider trading regulations, securities that are solely traded in over-thecounter transactions are not included.296
1. Information to Be Published
The ad-hoc publicity requirements establish only a duty to report and

SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 234.
293. The attempt of an insider violation also cannot be punished under general Criminal
Law provisions dealing with the criminality of attempts of criminal offenses, §§ 22-23 StGB,
since § 38 WpHG only qualifies as a Vergehen (misdemeanor) and hence cannot be pursuant
under §§ 22-23 StGB. See SIEBOLD, supra note 5, at 269.
294. See AssMANN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, § 38 para. 3; Immenga, supra note 5, at
204.
295. See supra part III.B.3.
296. WpHG § 15, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).

292.
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disclose new circumstances that have occurred within the issuer's sphere of
activity and that are not known to the public.297 Furthermore, these
circumstances must have the potential to materially affect the price of the
issuer's securities through their effect on the assets and financial condition
or the overall business performance of the issuer.29 With regard to the
provisions "circumstance," "not known to the public," and "possibility to
materially affect the price," the discussion applies likewise to the insider
information term.2 Thus, facts that must objectively be able to alter the
price of securities within a single Plus/Minus notification mark must remain
unknown to the market participants.
These unknown facts have to relate both to the assets and to the financial
condition or overall business performance of the issuer and must occur within
the sphere of the issuer.3
As can be seen from the formulation, this
definition of facts to be published is narrower than the formulation for inside
information in Section 13. The inside information provision only requires
that the facts relate to insider securities or the issuers of such securities,
whereas the ad-hoc publicity provision mandates the occurrence of the events
within the issuer's sphere.30
Therefore, all information that can be
qualified as new circumstances within the meaning of Section 15 automatically assumes inside information status, however, not all insider facts are
necessarily publishable by the issuer.302 For example, despite the fact that
market information constitutes inside information within the meaning of
Section 13, it does not have to be reported under Section 15.
Facts that might affect the assets and the financial condition or overall
business performance of an issuer and therefore have to be publicized
include: merger or acquisition agreements, transfer of control and transfer
of profits agreements, the acquisition or disposition of large blocks of shares,
the conclusion of important contracts with customers or suppliers, inventions,
product liability lawsuits filed against the issuer, and the issuance of
nonvoting preferred shares or debt instruments.3 3
The Act generally mandates a duty to disclose without delay. An
interesting question is exactly when is this duty triggered? This is especially
pertinent regarding important decisions that must be approved by various
groups. For instance, a merger plan might have been proposed by the

297. For a comprehensive discussion of WpHG § 15, see DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note
5, at 13; MORP, supra note 4, at 28; Dryander, supra note 4, at 28; Hopt, Basic Problems,
supra note 5, at 146; Peltzer, supra note 5, at 750.
298. WpHG § 15(1) sentence 1, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753).
299. See supra part III.B.3. with regard to these requirements.
300. WpHG § 15(1) sentence 1, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753-54).
301. DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 17.
302. MOHR, supra note 4, at 29.
303. M6iler, supra note 5, at 109.
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management body of a corporation, but still needs to be approved by the
supervisory board and, in certain cases, eventually by the shareholders. In
these cases, the legal obligation of Section 15 is assumed if the decision has
reached a certain degree of likelihood.3" Therefore, the duty to report does
not generally arise until the supervisory board has given its assent to
management's decisions, despite the fact that management plans are normally
approved by the supervisory board in Germany.305 Only in certain
scenarios might a CEO's plan itself trigger the disclosure obligation, for
example, if management's decision already has a large potential to alter the
price. The conclusion of a friendly merger agreement between the CEOs of
two companies could be such an example. However, the disclosure release
of the issuer must then expressly indicate the necessity of final approval.30 6
It has to be taken into account that although a management decision does not
generally actuate reporting obligations, it might well already constitute inside
information. Hence, trades based on such a decision are prohibited.3 7
Upon triggering the disclosure duties of Section 15(1) sentence 1, an
issuer first has to inform the Federal Supervisory Authority and the board of
directors of the stock exchange where the security or its derivative is traded,
308
about the relevant circumstances, before publishing them to the public.
Section 15(3) determines the method of publication to the market participant.
Accordingly, the issuer must disclose the facts in either one business
newspaper with nationwide circulation or through an electronic information
dissemination system that is widely used. After having published the
information, the issuer must place a notice about the publication in the
Federal Law Gazette 30 9 and send a copy to the Federal Supervisory
Authority."0 The issuer has the opportunity to apply to the Federal
Supervisory Authority for an exemption from the reporting and disclosure
duties of Section 15, if the obligation could be "likely to damage the
legitimate interests of the issuer. ' 31 1 Of particular importance is Section
15(6). According to this section, third persons have no cause of action
against issuers for damages caused by failure to comply with the ad-hoc
publicity requirement.

304. Assmann, PartII,
supra note 5, at 251.
305. MOHR, supra note 4, at 29.
306. DEuTSCHE BORSE AG, supra note 5, at 16.

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 16-17.
WpHG § 15(2), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1753-54); Immenga, supra note 5, at 205.
Bundesanzeiger (Federal Law Gazette).
WpHG § 15(3)-(4), v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1754) (detailing requirements).
Id. § 15(1) sentence 2, at S.1754; see also M611er, supra note 5, at 110.
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2.

The United States Equivalent

The U.S. counterpart of the German ad-hoc publicity is more or less the
filing requirement of an 8-K report of current events by an issuer of
securities that are registered pursuant to the SEA. 2 For example, issuers
must file a Form 8-K within fifteen calendar days after large acquisitions or
dispositions of their assets. 3 The SEA, however, also explicitly imposes
reporting duties for events such as tender offers by issuers or third parties,314 which under German law could only be requested indirectly under
the ad-hoc publicity. Hence, the SEA contains in some respects a more
detailed system of disclosure than the German Securities Trading Act. 5
B.

Reporting Obligation: Changes in Holdings of Voting Rights

The Securities Trading Act introduced a new duty to report changes in
the holdings of voting rights of German corporations 316 listed in a German
or European exchange.3 7 A concerned person, the holder of voting rights
that exceed or fall below the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, or 75% due
to acquisitions, disposals, or otherwise, must report it to the Federal
Supervisory Authority and the affected corporation. 3" The report has to
be filed no later than within seven calendar days and must contain the
address of the voting rights holder as well as the actual percentage of voting
rights.31 9 The seven-day time period begins from the time the holder
became aware of the knowledge, or from when the holder can be supposed
to have become aware of the knowledge, of the exceeding or falling below
the thresholds.32' After being notified, and then by no later than nine
calendar days, the exchange-listed company whose voting rights were
affected is required to place a statement containing the facts received
pursuant to Section 21 of the WpHG in at least one mandatory exchange
newspaper of national circulation. 321 This provision, among others, was
designed to protect target corporations and their shareholders from hostile
takeovers, which presumably will occur in Germany more often in the near

312. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 1, 249.308 (Form 8-K).
313. Id. §§ 249.308, 240.13a-11.
314. Id. §§ 240.13e, 240.13e-100 (Schedule 13E-3 for tender offers of third parties).

315. For an example, see the quarterly filed 10-Q report, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, of the Securities
Exchange Act.
316. WpHG § 21(2), v.26.7.1994 (BGB1. I S.1755).
317. Id. § 21, at S.1755.
318. Id. § 21(1) sentence 1, at S.1755.
319. Id.; see also MOHR, supra note 4, at 32.
320. WpHG § 21(1) sentence 2, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1755).
321. Id. § 25, at S.1756-57 (stating information regarding the procedure and obligations).
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future. 322
For the purpose of determining the concerned person's percentage under
Section 21, the Act provides an imputation of voting rights provision. For
example, the voting rights of an enterprise controlled by the holder or the
voting rights held by others on his behalf are deemed to be equivalent to the
voting rights held by the concerned person directly.323 Thus, this provision
in the Act is similar to Section 13(d) of the U.S. SEA and the rules
promulgated thereunder.3 24 Section 13(d) of the SEA requires purchasers
of securities that are registered under Section 12 to fulfill certain reporting
obligations within ten days after the acquisition of the securities. For
example, the purchaser is required to inform the issuer of the securities and
to file a statement with the SEC.325
One major difference between the German and the U.S. provision is the
event that triggers the reporting duties. The German Securities Trading Act
requires only that the purchaser hold, after the transaction and without regard
to the size of the transaction, a security amount that is below or above the
5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, or 75% thresholds. In contrast, in the United States
the SEA mandates a filing obligation for acquisitions through which the
purchaser will acquire more than 5% of securities of a corporation,326 along
with a duty to amend his filing statements after dispositions or purchases of
more than 1%.327 Thus, the German Act focuses on the triggering of
certain thresholds, while the U.S. SEA focuses on the size of a transaction.
C. Penalty Provisions
Pursuant to Section 39 of the German Act, intentional or reckless
violations of the reporting and disclosure provisions are punishable as
misdemeanors with fines of up to DM 3,000,000 for non-compliance with the
ad-hoc publicity requirement and of up to DM 500,000 for violations of
Section 21 (Reporting of Voting Share Changes).3 28

322. See, e.g., DIE WELT, Apr. 11, 1997, at 10 (reporting the recent hostile takeover

attempt of Thyssen by Krupp). Furthermore, major restructurings are expected in the banking
area. In acknowledgement of this, Germany has recently promulgated a takeover code.
323. See WpHG § 22, v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1755-56); MOHR, supra note 4, at 33.
324. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994).

325. Id. For the exact information that has to be mentioned in the statement, see Schedule
13D of the SEA. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a). The purchaser must, for example, list the total
number of securities directly or beneficially owned by him and provide facts relating to the
intention pursued with the acquisition. Id. § 240.13(d)(1)(A)-(D).
326. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l).

327. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13(d), 240.13d-2.
328. Parts of § 15 of the German Securities Trading Act also are only punishable with a
fine up to DM500,000. For more details, see the complete list in § 39. WpHG § 39,
v.26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1759-60); DEUTSCHE B6RSE AG, supra note 5, at 25.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The German Securities Trading Act, as part of the Second Financial
Markets Promotion Act, has dramatically improved the reputation of the
German financial markets. Overall, the insider law and the public disclosure
and reporting duties of the Act are meaningful and mostly stringent, thereby
achieving the German legislator's goal of keeping up with the regulatory
schemes of other, world-class financial markets. Some provisions concerning
the insider trading prohibition, however, reveal regulatory leaks. They can
be explained by the lack of insider law experience of German legislators and
by the reluctant attitudes of some parts of the Federal government because
if was finally forced by European Law to give up the previously existing
Insider Trading Guidelines and to enact insider rules.
One subject of criticism is the exclusion of a prohibition of primary
insiders from dissuading third persons to make transactions and the
nonadoption of restrictions for secondary insiders that are similar to those for
primary insiders. The Federal government would be strongly advised to
amend the Securities Trading Act with respect to these criticisms. Once
investors and securities dealers become fully aware of the existing gaps in the
Act, unethical and unpunishable practices can and will occur, thereby again
weakening the reputation of the German financial markets.
Nevertheless, especially with regard to the situation prior to the
enactment of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act, the German
insider law can now be considered a real obstacle for most of the current
insider trading practices. Thus, the Act is regarded as a successful attempt
by the German legislature to improve the domestic financial markets.
Evidence of this estimation lies in the violations of the insider trading
prohibition and the reporting duties of corporations that already have been
discovered. The investment industry, however, will need more legal certainty
with regard to the definition of various terms under the Securities Trading
Act, such as "suitability to materially affect the price." Unfortunately,
scholarly articles can only provide limited assistance. Therefore, only the
first cases that are decided by German courts about issues raised by the
Securities Trading Act will provide reliable guidance.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/7

44

